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Egalitarianism in young children
Abstract
Human social interaction is strongly shaped by other-regarding preferences. These preferences are key
for a unique aspect of human sociality - large scale cooperation with genetic strangers - but little is
known about their developmental roots. We show here that young children's other-regarding preferences
assume a particular form - inequality aversion - that develops strongly between the ages of 3 and 8. At
age 3-4, the overwhelming majority of children behave selfishly, while the vast majority at age 7-8
prefers resource allocations that remove advantageous or disadvantageous inequality. Moreover,
inequality aversion is strongly shaped by parochialism, a preference for favouring the members of one's
own social group. These results indicate that human egalitarianism and parochialism have deep
developmental roots, and the simultaneous emergence of altruistic sharing and parochialism during
childhood is intriguing in view of recent evolutionary theories which predict that the same evolutionary
process jointly drives both human altruism and parochialism.
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Human social interaction is strongly shaped by other-regarding preferences. These 
preferences are key for a unique aspect of human sociality – large scale cooperation with 
genetic strangers – but little is known about their developmental roots. We show here 
that young children’s other-regarding preferences assume a particular form – inequality 
aversion – that develops strongly between the ages of 3 and 8. At age 3-4, the 
overwhelming majority of children behave selfishly, while the vast majority at age 7-8 
prefers resource allocations that remove advantageous or disadvantageous inequality. 
Moreover, inequality aversion is strongly shaped by parochialism, a preference for 
favouring the members of one’s own social group. These results indicate that human 
egalitarianism and parochialism have deep developmental roots, and the simultaneous 
emergence of altruistic sharing and parochialism during childhood is intriguing in view 
of recent evolutionary theories which predict that the same evolutionary process jointly 
drives both human altruism and parochialism.  
 
Other-regarding preferences are decisive for the human ability to achieve and maintain 
cooperation in large groups of genetic strangers1,2. If an individual cares for the welfare of 
other group members, he or she is more likely to refrain from free-riding in cooperative 
projects. Likewise, if an individual dislikes the free-riding of others – because it is associated 
with inequality3-5 or because it represents a norm violation6 – the individual is more likely to 
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punish free-riders 7-9. This punishment then constitutes an incentive for potential free-riders to 
cooperate. Other-regarding preferences also play an important role in public life and politics10 
and they powerfully amplify reputational incentives in strategic interactions, thus contributing 
to the cooperation enhancing force of reputation opportunities11-14.  
The developmental origins and proximate mechanisms behind other-regarding 
preferences are not well understood, however, despite recent progress15-22. Since we know 
little about when young children start to take the welfare of others into account, we conducted 
experiments with 229 young, genetically unrelated, Swiss children (127 girls, 102 boys) 
between age 3 and 8. An understanding of the development of other-regarding preferences in 
children may enable us to gain deeper insights into the proximate and ultimate sources of 
species differences in preferences and cooperation. The study of children’s preferences is also 
of particular interest in light of recent experiments in nonhuman primates23-27, allowing a 
more direct comparison between humans and nonhuman primates. Experiments with 
nonhuman primates have, for example shown that chimpanzees show little willingness to 
provide food to a familiar conspecific in situations where they could do so with no or small 
cost23,24,27. In view of this result it is interesting to study whether and, if so, when children 
become willing to provide valuable resources to their partners. In this way, the large species 
differences in cooperation between humans and nonhuman primates can be more directly 
traced back to species differences in other-regarding preferences.  
There is a rich tradition in psychology that studies the development of moral judgment28 
and prosocial behaviour29-35 but there is a surprising lack of studies that isolate the 
development of other-regarding preferences from the development of other forms of prosocial 
behaviour. The experimental study of other-regarding preferences in humans involves the 
conduct of one-shot experiments with anonymous interaction partners because the behaviour 
in non-anonymous face-to-face interactions or in repeated interactions with the same partner 
can easily be affected by selfish motives. A subject could, for example, behave prosocially 
because of the expectation of future benefits from the partner that accrue as a result of 
prosocial behaviour in the current interaction. Selfish motives could therefore drive prosocial 
behaviours such as sharing a valuable resource in non-anonymous face-to-face interactions or 
in repeated interactions between the experimental subjects. Measuring other-regarding 
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preferences without such confounds thus requires the conduct of anonymous one-shot 
experiments.  
Testing for inequality aversion in children 
For this reason, we conducted experiments with young children that enable us to measure 
other-regarding preferences such as inequality aversion. In the context of our experiments, 
inequality aversion prevails if subjects prefer allocations that reduce the inequality between 
themselves and their partner, regardless of whether the inequality is to their advantage or to 
their disadvantage.3  
Each subject participated in the three treatments described below and was paired with 
one other anonymous partner in each treatment. Each treatment condition was explained in 
detail to the decision-maker so that we could be sure that the child had completely understood 
the experiment and the consequences of the different choices (see methods section and 
supplementary methods). In all treatments, the decision-maker allocated units of sweets 
(smarties, jellybabies, or fizzers), to himself and/or to the partner. In the “prosocial” 
treatment, which was inspired by recent experiments with chimpanzees23,24, the subject could 
choose between the allocation (1,1), i.e., (1 for himself, 1 for partner), and the allocation (1,0). 
This treatment measures some elementary form of prosociality because, by choosing (1,1) the 
subject can at no cost to himself deliver a benefit to the partner and, thus, avoid advantageous 
inequality. In principle, the choice of (1,1) can be driven by the equality motive3 or by a 
motive to increase the partner's payoff or both parties joint payoff36. Economic self-interest is 
not involved in the prosocial game because the decision-maker receives one unit regardless of 
which choice he makes. It is therefore also possible that a selfish individual who does not care 
about the partner's payoff will choose (1,1). In fact, because there is no reason for a selfish 
individual to make either choice, a population of self-interested individuals would choose 
(1,1) in 50% of the cases. For this reason, evidence for other-regarding behaviour in the 
prosocial game requires that the population of children choose (1,1) significantly above 50% 
frequency.  
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In the “envy” treatment, the subject could choose between (1,1) and (1,2). Here again, it 
is possible to deliver a benefit to the partner at no cost but the choice (1,2) leads to 
disadvantageous inequality for the decision-maker. Thus, if an individual just wants to 
increase the partner’s or the joint payoff, he should choose (1,1) in the prosocial treatment and 
(1,2) in the envy treatment. In contrast, if the equality motive drives behaviour in these two 
conditions, the subject chooses (1,1) in both treatments, thus avoiding the unequal allocations 
(1,0) in the prosocial treatment and (1,2) in the envy treatment. However, as in the prosocial 
treatment, a purely selfish individual has no reason to make either choice in the envy 
treatment. For this reason, evidence for the equality motive in the envy game again requires 
that the population of children choose (1,1) significantly above 50% frequency. 
In a third condition, the “sharing” treatment, the subject could choose between (1,1) and 
(2,0). This treatment measures a strong form of inequality aversion because the provision of a 
benefit for the partner is costly for the subject. Selfish children should therefore never make 
the egalitarian choice in this treatment, implying that the choice of (1,1) unambiguously 
indicates an other-regarding preference. Note also that the sharing treatment enables us to 
measure altruism as defined by evolutionary biology because sharing implies a costly transfer 
of a valued resource to another individual.  
In addition to these treatments, we also implemented an ingroup and an outgroup 
condition “across subjects”. In the ingroup condition, the partner came from the same 
playschool or kindergarten or school, while the partner came from another playschool, 
kindergarten, or school in the outgroup condition. The rationale for the outgroup condition is 
provided by evidence and theory indicating that parochialism strongly shapes adult human 
altruism37-39, and that the same evolutionary process might determine the development of both 
human altruism and parochialism40.  
From self-interest to inequality aversion  
Among the 3-4 year old children, the vast majority of the children behave selfishly in the 
ingroup condition of the sharing game because only 8.7% of the children are willing to share 
(Fig. 1). The fact that the frequency of (1,1) choices does not differ significantly from 50% in 
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the prosocial game and in the envy game further supports the low incidence of other-
regarding preferences at this age (Binomial test; p = 0.21 for the prosocial game, p = 0.68 for 
the envy game, N = 23). The prevalence of selfish behaviour in the sharing game decreases 
slightly for 5-6 year old children, but 78% are still not willing to share at this age. And, as in 
the case of 3-4 year old children, the frequency of egalitarian choices in the prosocial and the 
envy game is not significantly different from 50% (Binomial test; p = 0.24 for the prosocial 
game, p = 0.41 for the envy game, N = 36). A substantially different picture emerges, 
however, for children at age 7-8 (Fig. 1): 45% of them display sharing behaviour, and we also 
find strong evidence for other-regarding preferences in the other two games. 77% of the 7-8 
year old children prefer the egalitarian allocation in the prosocial game, refuting the null 
hypothesis of random choices (Binomial test, p < 0.001, N = 56). Likewise, an overwhelming 
majority of 80% prefers the egalitarian alternative in the envy game at this age (Binomial test, 
p < 0.001, N = 56).  
Taken together, the behavioural patterns across all three games suggest that children at 
age 3-4 display little willingness to share resources but a non-negligible percentage of the 
children is willing to make choices that benefit the recipient if it is not costly. Following this 
age, other-regarding preferences develop, which take the form of inequality aversion instead 
of a simple preference for increasing the partner’s or the joint payoff. If the motive to increase 
the partner’s or the joint payoff were to drive the children's other-regarding preferences, they 
would have then chosen the alternative (1,2) in the envy game. In fact, however, the 
overwhelming majority of the children at age 7-8 preferred the egalitarian allocation.  
Therefore, if we pool the children's choices across the various games, we find that both 
strongly and weakly egalitarian choices exhibit a large increase with age (Figure 2, 
supplementary figures and supplementary table). Egalitarianism, which is characterized by a 
(1,1)-choice both in the prosocial and the envy game (red columns in Figure 2), increases 
from 21% at age 3-4 to 33% at age 5-6, while 60% prefer the egalitarian allocation in both 
games at age 7-8. The percentage of egalitarian choices at age 7-8 differs significantly from 
an independent random choice in each of both games (Binomial test, p<0.0001, N = 56). If the 
children had made independent, random choices, only 25% of them would have chosen (1,1) 
in both the prosocial and the envy game. If we pool the children’s choices in all three games, 
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the percentage of children who prefer the egalitarian allocation in all three games increases 
from 4% at age 3-4 to 30% at age 7-8 (Figure 2). Thus, among those children who choose the 
egalitarian allocation in the prosocial and the envy game at age 7-8, roughly 50% share 
resources in the sharing game. The other 50% choose the selfish allocation (2,0) in the sharing 
game.  
It is also noteworthy that the share of subjects who maximize the partner’s payoff by 
choosing both (1,1) in the prosocial game and (1,2) in the envy game (blue columns in Figure 
2) decreases sharply from 43% at age 3-4 to 16% at age 7-8. In addition, the percentage of 
subjects who maximize the partner’s payoff in all three games is only roughly 5% and does 
not change much with age. The across-game perspective also enables us to identify a third 
type of subject whom we call “spiteful” because they minimize the partner’s payoff in all 
three games. The share of spiteful subjects is 22% at age 3-4 and 5-6 and decreases slightly to 
14% at age 7-8, a percentage that is similar to the relative share of spiteful subjects observed 
in adult subject pools41,42.  
Parochial Egalitarianism 
Parochial tendencies affected children’s choices in all three treatments, and these tendencies 
are pervasive in the sharing and prosocial game (Fig. 3). The egalitarian choice is roughly 15-
20 percentage points more likely in the prosocial game if the partner is an ingroup member 
(Fig. 3a). This difference is highly significant (ingroup dummy in probit regression, p = 
0.004, z = 2.92, N = 229) and a similar ingroup-outgroup gap prevails across all ages. The 
most striking difference is found in the sharing game (Fig. 3b), where we observe a strong 
increase in the frequency of egalitarian choices if the partner is from the ingroup (age effect in 
probit regression, p = 0.001, z = 3.33, N = 115), while the children’s willingness to share even 
slightly declines with age in the outgroup condition, although this decline is not significant 
(age effect in probit regression, p = 0.123, z = -1.54, N = 114). We observe, however, a strong 
interaction effect between age and outgroup condition (probit regression, p < 0.001, z = 3.50, 
N = 229), indicating that the difference between sharing in the ingroup and the outgroup 
conditions strongly increases with age. Thus, the children’s altruism and parochialism 
emerges simultaneously between the age of 3 and 8 and is associated with a very strong 
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ingroup bias (probit regression, p < 0.001, z = 3.58, N = 105) at age 7-8, with very little 
willingness to share with an outgroup member: only 12% of the children share in the outgroup 
condition at this age. 
The prevalence of egalitarian choices in the envy game develops earlier in the outgroup 
condition, where already the children at age 5-6 overwhelmingly favour the (1,1) allocation 
(Fig. 3c). The willingness to remove disadvantageous inequality towards ingroup members 
becomes so prevalent at age 7-8 that an ingroup-outgroup gap no longer exists. However, 
averaging across gender hides an important gender effect in the envy game: boys show much 
stronger parochial tendencies than do girls because boys seem to be much less averse against 
disadvantageous inequality if the partner is an ingroup member (Fig. 4a; outgroup dummy in 
probit regression controlling for age, p = 0.001, z = 3.23, N = 102). In contrast, girls do not 
differentiate in their choices between ingroup and outgroup partners (Fig. 4b; outgroup 
dummy in probit regression controlling for age, p = 0.663, z = -0.44, N = 127), but like boys, 
they also show an increasing trend towards egalitarian choices in the envy game as they 
become older.  
Birth order and sibling effects 
We find a strong “only child” and “youngest child” effect in the sharing game. Only children 
displayed much more costly sharing behaviour than children with siblings. On average, only 
children are 28 percentage points more likely to share than children with siblings – a highly 
significant difference (probit regression, p = 0.006, z = 2.75, N = 197) that also exists if we 
control for income effects (see supplementary data). With increasing age, however, the 
difference between only children and those with siblings decreases slightly, as indicated by an 
interaction effect between “only child” and “age” in a probit regression (p = 0.022, z = -2.29, 
N = 197). Among the children with siblings, we find that – regardless of age – the youngest 
children in a family are 17 percentage points less willing to share than children with younger 
siblings (probit regression controlling for age, p = 0.007, z = 2.71, N = 172). Thus it seems 
that the mere existence of siblings or birth order may play an important role in determining 
altruistic behaviours. Further analyses and interpretation of the effects of birth order and other 
demographic and psychological characteristics can be found in the supplementary data.  
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Discussion 
The development of inequality aversion relatively early in childhood is particularly interesting 
in the light of ethnographic evidence that suggests a strong role of egalitarian “instincts” in 
human evolutionary history. There is considerable ethnographic evidence that egalitarian 
concerns have shaped many human small scale societies43,44. For example, food-sharing 
across families seems to have been the rule rather than the exception in small scale societies, 
and egalitarian sentiments also play a role in contemporary large scale societies4,5. The 
important role of egalitarian sentiments in human evolutionary history raises the possibility 
that there may have been cultural or even genetic transmission that favors egalitarian 
behaviours. In fact, recent evidence from behavioural genetics suggests that egalitarian 
behaviour in the ultimatum game has a genetic component45.  
The simultaneous development of altruistic behaviour and parochialism and the gender 
differences in parochialism are also interesting in view of evolutionary theories that predict 
that the same evolutionary process40 jointly determines human altruism and parochialism, 
meaning that these traits co-evolve in such a way that either both or none of them evolves. 
According to the theory, the driving force behind this evolutionary process is frequent 
intergroup conflict. Because mainly males were involved in intergroup fights, it seems 
possible that evolution favoured a gender bias in parochialism. In fact, a payoff advantage 
relative to the outgroup may have been particularly advantageous for males because it 
strengthened the ingroup’s position in intergroup conflicts. Males bore the main cost of 
intergroup conflict in terms of injuries and deaths and often gained more than females in case 
of victory because of the increase in the pool of potential mating partners46. Thus, evolution 
may have favoured a greater sensitivity in males for payoff advantages relative to outgroup 
members. In view of this prediction, we find it remarkable that boys exhibit a much stronger 
ingroup bias than girls in the envy game.  
These potential evolutionary roots of human egalitarianism and parochialism do not 
preclude culture and socialization from playing an important role in other-regarding 
preferences; they may even be a main factor in their evolution2,47. As the children move from 
an informal playgroup to kindergarten and then on to formal schools, they may learn that 
equality is a rule the authorities (e.g., the teachers) endorse. Thus, the children are likely to 
 9
acquire some of the normative rules of the society which surrounds them during the age 
period on which we focused30. In this context, it is interesting that the motive to increase the 
partner’s payoff declined strongly between ages 3 and 8, while egalitarian behaviour strongly 
increased in this age period (Figure 2), providing a hint about the content of the normative 
rule they acquired. The children may also become more sensitive with regard the opinions of 
others about themselves, a cognition which requires the ability to understand that one’s 
actions affect what other people believe about oneself. Recent evidence indicates that adult 
humans care even about what anonymous others may think about them48,49. Theory-of-mind 
and perspective taking abilities are certainly conducive to such social cognitions. Therefore, if 
older children care more about what anonymous others thinks about them, they may be more 
prone to behave in a normatively appropriate way because – due to their age – they are more 
likely to have theory-of-mind and perspective taking abilities30,50.  
Finally, our results also indicate important inter-species differences in other-regarding 
preferences when compared to the patterns observed in chimpanzees23,24,27 and marmosets26. 
In the prosocial game, adult chimpanzees, who could allocate food in a face-to-face 
interaction to a familiar recipient, did not show a significant preference for the (1,1) 
choice23,24,27, while the overwhelming majority of the children develops a preference for the 
egalitarian choice in this game even though their partner is anonymous. And, as the sharing 
game indicates, many children at age 7-8 are also willing to share with an anonymous ingroup 
member. The facts in the envy game also contrast sharply with experimental findings in both 
chimpanzees and marmosets. The children developed a widespread aversion against 
disadvantageous inequality, whereas chimpanzees have been shown to be unwilling to take 
actions to remove inequality between themselves and a conspecific24, and marmosets even 
tend to take actions that generate disadvantageous inequality for themselves if the action 
provides food for the partner26. In view of the decisive role of other-regarding preferences for 
a species ability to achieve large-scale cooperation, the observed inter-species differences are 
likely to be an important part of explaining why humans are so exceptionally cooperative.  
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Methods Summary 
Each child played all three games against anonymous partners. In order to avoid satiation 
effects, a different currency was used in each of the three games (smarties, jellybabies, or 
fizzers). The currencies were randomized across games. In each game, subjects had two 
mutually exclusive choices that were represented with two cardboards; we drew two circles 
with arrows on each (see supplementary Figure S1). One arrow pointed to the decision maker, 
illustrating that the candy in that circle goes to him or her, while the other arrow pointed to a 
group photo which had been made earlier. In the ingroup condition, the group photo showed 
the members of the child’s playgroup, kindergarten or school, while it showed the members of 
a different playgroup, kindergarten or school in the outgroup condition. The photos were used 
to communicate the partner’s ingroup or outgroup status to the children in the game. 
Depending on whether the ingroup or the outgroup condition applied, the decision-maker was 
told that the candy(s) in the other circle (if there were any in that circle) would be given to one 
of the children on the ingroup photo or outgroup photo, respectively. If there was no candy in 
the circle, it was made clear to the child that the choice of the corresponding cardboard 
implies that the partner would receive nothing. We also controlled for the spatial assignment 
of the different alternative. In the prosocial game, for example, displayed in Figure S1, the 
alternative (1,1) was randomly assigned to be on the left side or on the right side. Thus, 
preferences for left or right cannot explain any of our findings. We also made it clear to the 
children that neither other children nor their parents or teachers will be informed about their 
decisions (see supplementary methods).  
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Methods 
Subjects. We recruited young children (3-8 years old) from playschools, kindergartens, and 
first grades for our experiments. We received permission for the experiments from the school 
president, the school board, the teachers, and the parents. 92% of the parents whom we asked 
agreed, so that a total of 229 children participated in the study – 62 children from playschools, 
75 from kindergartens, and 92 children from grade one. The children live in Rapperswil-Jona, 
a small city in the canton of St. Gallen, Switzerland. Two women aged between 20 and 25 
conducted the experiment. The experimental instructions are reproduced in the supplementary 
information. 
Experimental procedures. Each child played the prosocial game, the envy game, and the 
sharing game against anonymous partners. The order of the games was counterbalanced 
across subjects. The partners either came from the ingroup (same playschool, or kindergarten 
or school) or from an outgroup (a different playschool, kindergarten, or school).  
Payoffs. We needed an experimental currency desirable for the younger and older children in 
our sample. Therefore we decided to use various sweets. In order to avoid satiation effects, a 
different currency was used in each of the three games (smarties, jellybabies, or fizzers), and 
the currencies were randomized across games. Before the experiment started, we asked each 
child whether he or she likes those sweets (all of them did). At the end of all three treatments 
we asked the child whether it likes all three sweets the same or whether it likes one more than 
the other. If the child indicated that it liked some of the sweets more than the others we asked 
which one it liked the most and which the least (see supplementary material). The average 
“liking rates" of the different currencies were identical. Moreover, we asked the parents to 
rate on a 7 point scale how much their children value the candies. The parents’ answers 
revealed that our currencies provide equally strong incentives for the children across all ages.  
The choice situation. In order to ensure that the children can easily understand the choice 
problem, we used a set up that made the two available choices transparent. The two mutually 
exclusive choices were represented with two cardboards; we drew two circles with arrows on 
each (see supplementary Figure S1). One arrow pointed to the decision maker, illustrating that 
the candy in that circle goes to him or her, while the other arrow pointed to a group photo 
which had been made earlier. In the ingroup condition, the group photo showed the members 
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of the child’s playgroup, kindergarten or school, while it showed the members of a different 
playgroup, kindergarten or school in the outgroup condition. The photos were used to 
communicate the partner’s ingroup or outgroup status to the children in the game. Depending 
on whether the ingroup or the outgroup condition applied, the decision-maker was told that 
the candy(s) in the other circle (if there were any in that circle) would be given to one of the 
children on the ingroup photo or outgroup photo, respectively. If there was no candy in the 
circle, it was made clear to the child that the choice of the corresponding cardboard implies 
that the partner would receive nothing. The advantage of this design is that the same 
procedure can be used for the ingroup and the outgroup condition, and that the children can 
grasp the partner’s ingroup or outgroup status very easily. In fact, many children across all 
ages immediately expressed their knowledge about the children on the photo, i.e. they 
spontaneously indicated that they know the children on the photo or they don’t know them. 
Based on this spontaneous insight, it was then easy to explain that the partner will be a 
member of the child’s group or the member of another group.  
We also controlled for the spatial assignment of the different alternative. In the prosocial 
game, for example, which is displayed in Figure S1 (supplementary methods), the alternative 
(1,1) was randomly assigned to be on the left side or on the right side. Thus, preferences for 
left or right cannot explain any of our findings. We also made it clear to the children that 
neither other children nor their parents or teachers will be informed about their decisions.  
Before a child played a game we ensured that he or she fully understood the game situation 
(i.e., the available choices, the implications of different choices for the allocation of 
currencies for “self” and “partner”, the partner's ingroup-outgroup status, etc.). The subjects 
had to answer several questions for this purpose (supplementary methods). Only three 
children had problems in answering these questions, which shows that we successfully 
implemented the three games even for the youngest participants in the sample. The three 
children who could not answer correctly were excluded from the data analyses (229 is the 
number of children who correctly answered the questions). Once the children had answered 
the questions correctly, they were asked to make a decision in the first game before the second 
game was presented and explained. Because we ensured that the children understood the 
payoff implications of the two available choices very well and because it was clear that the 
choices were mutually exclusive (i.e. only one cardboard could be chosen), the children did 
not make mistakes while choosing, e.g., by indicating that they wanted to choose both 
cardboards. Nor did any children reverse their opinion during the choice process, i.e., children 
who first chose one cardboard but later switched to the other.  
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Questionnaire. After all children had participated in the experiment we sent the parents a 
questionnaire in which we asked them about characteristics of their child, such as whether he 
or she can easily imagine how other children feel (“empathy”), whether there are siblings, 
birth order, who primarily cares for the child during the day, the number of regular playmates, 
etc. We sent 198 questionnaires to the parents and 161 questionnaires were sent back. The 
questionnaire is reprinted in the supplementary material. 
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Figure 1  The relative frequency of egalitarian choices across all ingroup 
treatments. In these treatments, the decision-maker’s choice determines the resources of an 
ingroup partner. The frequency of egalitarian choices strongly increases with age across all 
three ingroup treatments, and the vast majority of children prefers equality at age 7-8 in the 
prosocial and the envy game. However, if equality is costly for the children, they choose the 
egalitarian allocation less frequently – as indicated by the behaviour in the sharing game – 
and at age 3-4, self-interested choices dominate almost completely. 
 
Figure 2 Behavioural types in the ingroup condition. The figure classifies subjects 
according to their behaviour in all three games, i.e., in the prosocial game (1,1 versus 1,0), 
the sharing game (1,1 versus 2,0), and the envy game (1,1 versus 1,2). Strongly egalitarian 
subjects choose the egalitarian allocation in all three games. Weakly egalitarian subjects 
choose the egalitarian allocation only in the prosocial and the envy game, but not in the 
sharing game where egalitarian behaviour is costly. Strongly generous subjects choose the 
allocation that maximizes the partner’s payoff in all three games. Weakly generous subjects 
maximize the partner’s payoff only in the prosocial and the envy game, but not in the sharing 
game where generous behaviour is costly. Spiteful subjects choose the allocation that 
minimizes the partner’s payoff in all three games. The percentage of egalitarian subjects 
increases steeply with age, while the share of generous subjects declines. Moreover, most 
subjects who are willing to share at age 7-8 belong to the egalitarian and not to the generous 
type of subjects.  
 
Figure 3  Egalitarian Choices across ingroup and outgroup conditions. a. In the 
prosocial game, the children remove inequality that favours themselves more often if the 
partner is an ingroup member. b. Egalitarian choices even slightly decrease over time in the 
sharing game – with very little sharing at age 7-8 – if the partner is an outgroup member, 
while sharing with ingroup members strongly increases with age, providing strong evidence 
for parochial altruism in children. c. In the envy game, children develop a preference for 
equality much earlier if the partner is an outgroup member but eventually the aversion 
against disadvantageous inequality with regard to ingroup members becomes so strong that 
ingroup-outgroup differences are small.  
 
Figure 4  Gender differences in parochial egalitarianism in the envy game where the 
child could choose between (1,1) and (1,2). a. Boys’ propensity for egalitarian choices in 
the ingroup and the outgroup condition. b. Girls’ propensity for egalitarian choices across the 
ingroup and outgroup condition. The difference between ingroup and outgroup condition is 
large for boys but virtually absent for girls.  
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